Defining the Iraqi Question

In studying the Iraqi question, it is important to tackle this task methodically to keep it away, as far as possible, from the political contest of the domestic politics. Then, first, it is fundamental to settle a methodology to define our terms. Defining the terms of 'war' and 'victory' and clarifying their implications and settings in the discourse concerning Iraq are needed tasks for understanding the Iraqi question and to its policy-making.

The 'war on Iraq'?

The 'war on Iraq' was a war to overthrow the Iraqi Ba'athist dictatorial regime. The matter of WMD stockpiles is not the key point for me. No one could be totally certain about those stockpiles – until now – in a country is larger than 400,000 km² and was ruled by an extraordinary dictatorship where transparency means death. Who knows the destiny of Saddam's WMD stockpiles is Saddam himself. Moreover, as I said in 2003 before the war, Saddam represents the WMD himself.

The point of all is that Saddam and his regime are the real source of danger not what they own or not. The perception of this danger has fundamentally changed after the September 11, which changed the insight into the world relations and politics in addition to the international perspective of security and its applied policies. What was acceptable before 9/11 is not so far after 9/11.

The case of America under attack made this acceptance and overlooking impossible. Therefore, the situation of Saddam in power, who has territory, money, scientists, criminal nature and extraordinary bad intentions towards his neighbors and the Middle East peace is a matter of real concern. Moreover, if we took into account the facts that he imposes a totalitarian bloody Ba'athist regime on Iraq, and he had a period of 12 years after his defeat in the Gulf war ΙΙ to react systemically by promoting the Islamization of the state and the society in Iraq in spite of the state's official totalitarian secular ideology of al-Ba'ath party the matter of concern will be a matter of international threat. This conduct, which its results have been visible now in the violence level of the Iraqi society, indicates somehow a big mistake by the U.S. of keeping indifference to that situation in the past.

The perception of that as a threat and potential danger entailed the 9/11. The empirical survey of the post-9/11 realities accompanied with a realistic approach shows clearly that the totalitarianism in its all aspects, religious and ideological could constitute an integrated system, a system of convenience and operation. The connection between the totalitarian regimes and terrorist groups in the Middle East became apparent through the pragmatic and cynical support of those regimes to several terrorist groups and activities. The Iraq war and the regional totalitarian regimes' behavior concerning it serve as a meaningful example.

Furthermore, the 'war on Iraq,' obviously did not intend to ensure the full Iraqi compliance with the international resolutions because the official objective of the Operation Iraqi Freedom was changing the Iraqi regime not forcing it to do something. Hence, this war was to break the Iraqi dictatorship through overthrowing Saddam's Ba'athist regime, and to install a democratic system in Iraq.

Strategically, this serves many goals including:

Reshaping the geopolitics of the Middle East; the region that has key importance to the international security after 9/11 and to the world energy security.
Establishing the shining center of freedom and democracy in the Middle East in Iraq, besides removing the potential danger of the Iraqi totalitarianism.
Strengthening the American presence and power in the Middle East to ensure the American interests there in the long run, and to forestall the future movement of the future rivals of far east powers in this important region.
Ending the late Cold War era and the soviet legacy in the Middle East and weakening the flourishing authoritarianism there through the new and changing realities and policies.
Employing the change in the Middle East in promoting the foundations and bases of an international order can cope with world security challenges.
Liberating Iraqi oil market from Saddam's regime and strengthening the U.S. reach to oil supplies.

This war is not concerning Iraq only but also the entire Middle East, so, this war in sense and implications is not 'Iraq war', it is 'Middle East war.'

The Iraq 'victory'?

The focal goal of this war is establishing the democratic state in Iraq, and the goal of the totalitarian and terrorist regimes and groups is to stall this project. For some totalitarian neighboring regimes, the task is very clear that the new democracy in Iraq must fail whatever it takes. They know exactly that a next-door democracy is something unaffordable to the stability and sustainability of their rules. In addition, they need to convey a message, accompanied with a supporting show, to the world that they are the only option for stability in the region. The jihadists, for their part, want to expel the international presence in addition to its democracy from Iraq, and they need a sanctuary and operation base there or wherever.

Hence, the 'victory' is the establishment of the Iraqi sustainable democratic state. This is to say, the establishment of the functioning democratic institutions of state rest on democratic principles and foundations, and through a comprehensive and inclusive political process.

Actually, this political process is almost done, particularly after adopting a democratic constitution and forming the permanent elected government and the nascent new Iraqi army. This constitution must basically ensure the democratic political system and guarantees besides the human rights and democratic liberties, and those are adopted to large extent by the current constitution. The current disagreements on the some characteristics of the political system including mainly the scope of federalism are an Iraqi issue subject to the Iraqis to tackle them through political compromise and by democratic means. It is normal for any constitution to develop through time and to have amendments.

The key political problem or deficit in the political process was the Sunni boycott of the political process and consequently the Sunnis' political marginalization after the Sunnis made the wrong decisions and chose the wrong way to deal with the change in Iraq. Hence, the overwhelming success of the election of the full-term parliament and consequently forming the national unity government were watersheds in the success of the Iraq project after the intensive participation of the Sunnis besides the all Iraqis.

At this stage, the final stake of the totalitarian and terrorist forces on the exclusiveness and partiality of the Iraqi political system as a cover for the instability and violence in Iraq has failed. This would be a turning point in their destructive effort towards the chaotic and random violence against civilians. Security would be the main problem and challenge to realize 'victory.'

The solely military thinking of this issue will be extremely misleading. The political considerations are essential and have determining quality in Iraq's security question. The ability of Iraq to defend itself or the government to do so — as a condition to withdraw from Iraq — is a term could not be perceived by the military sense only; it entails the political sense and considerations to make sense.

Hence, the inclusion of the Sunnis in the state's political institutions and political power is a key factor in the government's ability to defend Iraq. In addition, it gives the full legitimacy to the government's offensives inside Iraq and removes any political or public cover to the insurgency in the Sunni areas; this will fundamentally weaken it.

Consequently, the multinational forces could be redeployed towards more secure areas and back from the front line keeping its supportive role to the Iraqi forces, along with a rolling reduction in the troops' number. However, the American and international responsibility to deal seriously with the regional destructive role of some totalitarian regimes is indispensable to ensure the victory in Iraq.

The violence is something familiar and somehow normal in the qualitative and historic changes in the political history. Building the first ever democracy in Iraq and the region (except for Israel) in this comprehensive authoritarian environment is something could not be done in 20 months and smoothly. However, after establishing and strengthening the state's democratic institutions, in the long run, the security issue and its implications and requirements, including the political dues, is an Iraqi affair and is of the Iraqis' duties and responsibilities. Here the U.S. will just provide a supportive role inside Iraq and an essential role outside Iraq.

The victory is the reality when the democratic Iraq can primarily defend its democracy and itself.